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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent. )
)
V. )
) 2d Civil No. B084899 
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC. )
) Los Angeles County
Defendant and Petitioner, ) Superior Court No. WEC13985
___________________________________________ )
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed suit against 
Globe International, Inc.^ in the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
alleging libel per se. (Clerk's Transcript 137.)^ A jury trial 
ensued, and the jury entered a special verdict on March 25, 1994, 
finding that: (1) the article was a neutral and accurate report of 
the statements made by Robert Morrow in The Senator Must Die: (2) 
Khawar was a private figure; (3) Globe published the article 
negligently by failing to learn whether the statements were false 
prior to publishing; (4) Globe published the article either 
knowing that the defamatory statements were false or with reckless 
disregard of whether the defamatory statements were true or false;
* Herein referred to as "
^ Herein referred to as "C.T.", Reporter's Transcript referred to as
1
and (5) Globe published the article with malice or oppression.
(C.T. 2780-83.) The trial judge subsequently overruled the jury's 
finding and determined that the article was in fact not a fair and 
accurate report but allowed the rest of the verdict to stand.
(C.T. 2742-44.) On April 15, 1994 the court entered judgment in 
favor of Khawar against Globe in the amount of $1,175,000. (C.T.
3110.) Globe filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment on 
June 6, 1994. (C.T. 3125, 3130.) After undertaking an
independent review of the record, the Court of Appeal for the 
Second District affirmed the judgment on June 5, 1996. Khawar v. 
Globe IntM - Inc. . 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, review granted, (1996). 
This Court granted review on September 25, 1996. Id^ at 92.
Sf.atement of Facts
In late 1965, a Pakistani student named Khalid Iqbal Khawar 
obtained press credentials and began serving as a newspaper 
reporter and photographer for Pakistani publications. (R.T. 
1333:25-27; 1335:18-24.) Mr. Khawar started covering events 
involving Senator Robert F. Kennedy in April, 1968. (R.T. 1337:2-
5.)
On the night of June 4, 1968, Mr. Khawar went to the 
Ambassador Hotel as a freelance journalist to cover Senator 
Kennedy's California Primary victory announcement. (R.T. 1337:2- 
5.) Mr. Khawar located himself near the Senator as one of 25-30 
people on the victory podium during Senator Kennedy's speech.
(R.T. 1389:22-24; 1390:1-2.) Mr. Khawar testified at trial that
2
he wanted to be close to Senator Kennedy in order to take pictures 
of the event as well as to have his own picture taken with Senator 
Kennedy. {R.T. 1340:7-11.) That night, Mr. Khawar took 
photographs of Senator Kennedy, and also had a friend take 
photographs of Mr. Khawar and Senator Kennedy together on the 
stage. (R.T. 1340:12-26.) Due to Mr. Khawar's proximity to 
Senator Kennedy and the extensive press coverage of the night, Mr. 
Khawar testified that he was not surprised to see an occasional 
photograph of himself with the Senator. (R.T. 1390-91:18-2; 
1392:1-12.) Mr. Khawar's image was in fact seen on national 
television that evening, in Time magazine the following week, on 
annual television broadcasts of the Kennedy assassination footage, 
and on videotape coverage of the night available to the public 
through the California State Archives. (R.T. 1391:25-26; 1392:3- 
14; 1393:2-9; 710:16-20.) In addition, Mr. Khawar retained copies 
of the photographs of himself and Senator Kennedy in his house and 
office and estimated that thousands of friends, employees and 
other people had seen the photographs. (R.T. 1359:3-12.) He was 
proud of this notoriety. (R.T. 1358:18-20.)
Directly following Senator Kennedy's victory speech in the 
Embassy Room, he was assassinated in the pantry area of the hotel, 
located to the left of the stage. (R.T. 954:4-5.) After the June 
5, 1968 assassination, Mr. Khawar left the United States on 
November 6, 1968, (R.T. 1351:13.) He later returned on May 7,
1971. (R.T. 1353:27.) Mr. Khawar moved to Bakersfield, and he
3
evencually became a United States citizen in 1977. (R.T. 1355:4-
6, 1370:10.)
On November 30, 1988, Roundtable Press published Robert
Morrow's book The Senator Must Die:__The Murder of Robert F.
Kennedy. (C.T. 140.) In the book, Morrow outlined an
assassination theory detailing an elaborate plot between the CIA, 
the Iranians, and the Mafia to kill Senator Kennedy. (C.T. 140.) 
The book featured photographs portraying Mr. Khawar standing next 
to the Senator, identical in all respects except clarity to the 
photograph that had appeared in Time magazine and on previous 
television footage. (R.T. 1357:20-26; 1392:3,9-23.) Despite the 
photographic identification of Mr. Khawar, Morrow referred to the
I
assassin as Ali Ahmand and not as Mr. Khawar.- (C.T. 140.)
Shortly after the publication of Morrow's book, John 
Blackburn, a reporter for Globe. interviewed Morrow about The 
qfanar.or Must Die. (R.T. 1093:9-14.) Mr. Blackburn wrote a news 
stor/ about the book, summarizing Morrow's assassination theory as 
a newsworthy event due to the intense and continuing interest in 
the Kennedy assassinations. (R.T. 1601:9-28.) The article 
contained a total of fifteen attributions to Morrow as the source 
of the information in the article. (R.T. 1596:1-13.) Mr. 
Blackburn testified that he made an effort to contact "Ali Ahmand" 
through telephone directory assistance, but was unable to locate
* ”.-.li Ahmand” is actually a reference to Ali Ahmad. Mr. Khawar's
father. (R.T. 1385:17-28.)
4
him. ^R.T. 1120:23-1121:9.) Globe published Mr. 51ac;<burn' s 
amrie on April 4, 1989 and ran a photograph reproduced from the 
Morrcw book that depicted Mr. Khawar standing on the podium next 
CO Senator Kennedy with an additional black arrow pointing to Mr. 
Khawar. (R.T. 1357:20-28.) Consistent with Morrow's book, the 
article identified the alleged assassin as Ali Pihmand. not Mr. 
Khawar. (C.T. 140.)
Subsequent to the publication of the book and the article, 
Mr. Khawar made an appearance on the local television station, 
KERO CO rebut the charges made in the book and Che Globe article.
R.T. 381:22-23, 1590:25-23.)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Respondent was a limited purpose public figure when 
he voluntarily interjected himself into the public 
controversies of Senator Kennedy's election and 
assassination.
2. Whether punitive damages were inappropriate in the absence of 
a showing of actual malice.
3. Whether the Globe news article about Robert Morrow's book.
The Senator Must Die. constituted a neutral and accurate 
report, thereby subjecting the article to the neutral 
reportage privilege.
6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the lower court for 
three reasons. First, Mr. Khawar was a limited purpose public 
figure and, therefore, the Globe article was subject to the 
protection defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its 
progeny. A voluntary limited purpose public figure is one who, 
under normal circumstances, is a private figure, but then 
voluntarily injects himself into a vortex of public controversy. 
Mr. Khawar qualifies as a voluntary limited purpose public figure 
because he voluntarily injected himself into the vortex of public 
controversy surrounding the election and assassination of Senator 
Kennedy. Mr. Khawar was a journalist who persistently followed 
famous public figures and proudly displayed photographs of himself 
with public figures, thereby reaping the benefits of his actions. 
Additionally, Mr. Khawar is an involuntary limited purpose public 
figure because the assassination was a "major public occurrence."
Second, no actual malice was shown during the trial and 
therefore, punitive damages were wrongly awarded. A public 
figure, whether general or limited purpose, must show actual 
malice in order to recover punitive damages. The standard for 
actual malice in defamation cases is actual knowledge that the 
statements made were false. There was no evidence presented at 
trial that Mr. Blackburn actually knew the statements were false. 
Since no malice was shown, punitive damages were wrongly awarded. 
In the alternative, even if Mr. Khawar were a private figure, he
7
was still involved in events of substantial public concern, mainly 
the election and assassination, and, therefore, must also show 
actual malice.
Finally, the nlobe article constituted a neutral and accurate 
report of the theory in Morrow's book The Senator Must Die and, 
accordingly, should have been protected from liability under the 
neutral reportage privilege. The neutral reportage privilege 
protects accurate, newsworthy and disinterested republications, 
even when such republications contain false statements. The globe 
article republished statements from Morrow's book without 
concurring in or deliberately altering those statements. The 
article contained fifteen attributions to Morrow as the source of 
the statements and reported on the publication of Morrow's book as 
a newsworthy event in and of itself. The picture of Mr. Khawar 
which mobe ran with the article was identical in all respects 
except clarity to the photographs in Morrow's book as well as the 
photograph that had appeared in Time. Therefore, when examined in 
totality, the Rlobe article qualifies as a neutral, accurate and 
disinterested republication, not original defamation.
Even if California has not adopted the neutral reportage 
privilege, the privilege should be adopted by this Court 
consistent with the Second Circuit's finding in Edwards v.
Audubon Soc'v. Inc^ Sound public policy favors the 
creation of an area of protection for the republication of 
defamation. Although there is a delicate balance between the
8
individual's right to privacy and the right to free press, the 
danger of quelling free speech necessitates a high level of 
tolerance for publication. The neutral reportage privilege is not 
an unlimited privilege and presents a workable guideline for 
protecting the free flow of newsworthy information.
ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENT WAS A LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE 
VOLUNTARILY THRUST HIMSELF INTO A VORTEX OF PUBLIC 
CONTROVERSY.
A. The Standard Of Review Is De Novo.
In cases involving free speech, the evidence should be 
reviewed de novo. S.ee New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 
254, 285 (1964). Accordingly, this Court should reevaluate the 
trial findings through an independent review of the record. 
Additionally, whether an individual is a private or public figure 
should be a finding made by the trial judge because it is a mixed 
question of law and fact. See Rosenblatt v. Baer. 383 U.S. 75, 88 
(1966); Reader’s Digest Ass'n. Inc, v. Superior Court. 27 Cal. 3d 
244, 252 (1984). Because the jury, instead of the judge, decided 
the issue of whether Mr. Khawar was a public or private figure, 
this Court should make an independent examination and determine 
the status of the plaintiff anew.
Moreover, a de novo standard of review also applies 
specifically to the question of actual malice. See Bose v. 
Consumer Union of the United States. 466 U.S. 485 (1984); McCov v. 
Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835 (1984). This Court should,
9
therefore, make an independent determination of whether or not a 
finding of actual malice was supported by the facts at trial.
B. Roth The Future Election And Assassination Of Senatojr
Kennedy Were Public Controversies.
A limited purpose public figure is one who "voluntarily 
injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy 
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of 
issues." Veaod Com. v ■ ABC. Inc. , 25 Cal. 3d 763, 767 
(1979) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 351 
(1974)). The requisite public controversy can vary greatly in 
what it involves, but it is generally defined as an event that
"warrants public attention." Partington v._Bugliosl> 56 F.3d
1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995). A controversy qualifies "if the issue 
was being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and 
substantial ramifications for nonparticipants." Waldbaum v. 
Fairchild Publications. Inc.. 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
1980). It is "any topic upon which sizeable segments of society 
have different, strongly held views." barman —Flynt Distrib.
Co.. Inc.■ 745 F.2d 123, 137 (2d Cir. 1984).
The presidential candidacy and murder of Senator Kennedy at 
issue in this case meet this definition. An election, by its 
nature, sparks many "different, strongly held views." An
election involving the brother of the slain ex-President John F. 
Kennedy is certain to involve even more than usual media 
attention. Therefore, the RFK presidential campaign alone is 
enough to qualify as a public controversy. Furthermore, the
10
subsequent murder of Senator Kennedy was—and remains--a public 
controversy itself.
Many limited purpose public figure cases have involved a 
public controversy consisting of facts much more mundane than 
those in the instant case. A man espousing proper earthquake 
safety procedures was held to be a limited purpose public figure 
in Copp v. Paxton. 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 846 (1996). Copp 
involved a private figure who became public for a limited purpose 
because "[t]he issue of earthquake disaster mitigation in public 
schools had 'foreseeable and substantial ramifications for 
nonparticipants.'" Id. Local politically debated horse racing 
issues were a "public controversy" in Mosesian v. McClatchv 
Newspapers. 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1689-93 (1991). The limited 
purpose public figure in Mosesian had involved himself in the 
local debate on horse racing. Id. Both of these cases involved 
issues much less important to the general public than a national 
presidential election.
Cases denying "public controversy" status to an event are few 
and distinguishable. The leading example is Veaod Corp. v. ABC. 
Inc^, 25 Cal. 3d 763 (1979). Veaod involved the closing of a San 
Francisco department store. That scenario is of much less 
interest to the general public of San Francisco, and arguably of 
no interest to the rest of the country. It has nothing to do with 
public affairs or public figures. A presidential campaign and 
assassination are of such heightened importance to the entire 
nation that the two cases are incomparable.
11
c. The Difference; Between The Campaign And The Murder _Is Inconsecaiential Because Limited Purpose Public—Fiqure 
Status Applies To ”Anv Related Defamation Action”.
Petitioner argues that since Mr. Khawar was not actually 
present in the Embassy Ballroom during the murder, he did not 
voluntarily thrust himself in the murder controversy. Yet, this 
Court has held that "such significant, voluntary efforts to inject 
oneself into the public arena require that such a person or 
organization be classified as a public figure in any related 
defamation action." Reader's Digest Ass'n^—Inc . y.^—Superior 
Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 256 (1984) (emphasis added). The campaign 
was intimately linked to the murder, and Mr. Khawar was 
photographed with Senator Kennedy just minutes before the murder. 
(R.T. 1341:5-12.) The fact that the killing occurred in a 
different room does not mean that the campaign is not a related 
action.
Mr. Khawar was constantly seeking out figures in the public 
limelight to photograph and with whom to be photographed. (R.T. 
1335:18-28; 1336:1-18.) He was a journalist active in politics, 
including the 1968 presidential election. (R.T. 1336:8-18.) In 
addition to Senator Kennedy, he covered Hubert Humphrey, George 
Wallace, Vice President Nixon, and Alan Cranston. (R.T. 1336.9- 
18.) He then published these articles in Pakistan under his name. 
(R.T. 136:16-27.) These were all significant efforts to involve 
himself in the public arena. These efforts make him a limited 
purpose public figure for the assassination, which, in addition to 
being closely related to the presidential election, was a direct 
consequence of it.
12
D. Respondent Thrust Himself Into The Public Controversy.
The category of limited purpose public figure has been 
defined by this Court as encompassing individuals who, under 
normal circumstances, have not achieved enough fame such that they 
would always be considered a public figure. Reader’s Digest 
Ass'n, Inc, v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244, 253 (1984). This 
Court defined the limited purpose public figure as one who 
"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public 
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited 
range of issues." Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 
U.S. 323, 351 (1974)(emphasis added)). Courts must focus on 
affirmative actions and the "nature and extent of an individual's 
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the 
defamation." Id,, at 254 (citing Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass'n. 
Inc.. 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979)).
This case involves a journalist who pursued Senator Kennedy 
and was consequently identified with the events he had sought to 
become a part of. Mr. Khawar took numerous affirmative steps in 
order to inject himself into the vortex of both public 
controversies at issue. He arrived early the night of the 
assassination so he could climb onto the podium and have his 
picture taken with the new Presidential Candidate Robert Kennedy. 
(R.T. 1339:23-27; 1340:10-11.) He was on that podium both before 
and after Senator Kennedy arrived. (R.T. 1348:11-23.) He 
published his pictures of the election and murder in Pakistan.
(R.T. 1350:26-27.) He enjoyed displaying the picture of himself 
and Senator Kennedy in his office. (R.T. 1357:18-23.) He was
13
(R.T. 1358:18-proud of being pictured with political leaders.
20 ) He let thousands of people see these pictures displayed in 
his office. (R.T. 1359:1-5.) He was even pictured on the cover 
of Time magazine published the week following the murder, and then 
purchased and kept a copy. (R.T. 1392:3-18.) Mr. Khawar is 
thereby differentiated from the innocent victim who was "dragged 
xanwillingly into the controversy." Wplstoii/ 443 U.S. at 166.
Cases where the actions of the private figure were 
insufficient to create public figure status are distinguished by 
the absence of almost any voluntary acts. In Wolston, for 
example, the Court held that Wolston was "dragged unwillingly into 
the controversy." Id. at 166. This is much different than Mr. 
Khawar's affirmative and voluntary actions of continuously seeking 
to photograph Senator Kennedy. A socialite was defamed in Time, 
Tnc. V- Firestone. 424 U.S. 448 (1976) . Wealth and social 
activity were insufficient to make the plaintiff a public figure. 
Id. at 455. Again, Mr. Khawar was not merely conducting his life 
in an ordinary fashion as was the case in Firestone. Mr. Khawar s 
affirmative pursuit of popular figures differentiates him from a 
mere socialite. An ordinary contractor was accused of performing 
shoddy work in Brown v. Kelly Broad. Cq_^ , 48 Cal. 3d 711 (1989) . 
That contractor had not done anything that an ordinary, private 
contractor would not do. Id■_ at 750. Performing contracting 
duties for an average clientele is distinguishable from 
photographing and pursuing presidential candidates. The 
affirmative actions of Mr. Khawar therefore are distinct from 
Brown.
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E. A Lapse Of Time Does Not Invalidate Limited Purpose
Public Figure Status.
The fact that a number of years lapsed between Mr. Khawar’s 
action and the article published by Globe is irrelevant to Mr. 
Khawar's status. "Public figure status, once achieved, does not 
end spontaneously with the stopping of the publicity." Mosesian. 
233 Cal. App. 3d at 1703. The Supreme Court has specifically 
declined to rule on this issue. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest 
Ass’n. Inc.. 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979). However, "it appears that 
every court of appeals that has specifically decided this question 
has concluded that the passage of time does not alter an 
individual's status as a limited purpose public figure."
Partington v. Bualiosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 (1995).'* Therefore, 
whatever Mr. Khawar may have been doing at the time of the 
article's publication is irrelevant in regard to his status as a 
limited purpose public figure in this case.
Cases involving a lapse of time that has caused revocation of 
the public figure status are distinguishable from the case at bar. 
This Court held that limited purpose public figures do not remain 
public if the controversy no longer draws any public attention. 
Briscoe v. Reader ■ .q Digest Ass'n. Inc.. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 540 (1971). 
Briscoe is distinguishable for three reasons. First, the case 
involved an actual criminal who had been convicted of a crime 
eleven years before the defamatory article was published. Id. at 
532-33. The Court reasoned that the criminal should not continue
■* See ■ e. g. . Street v. National Broad. Co.. 645 F.2d 1227, 1235 (6th 
Cir. 1981); Brewer v. Memphis Publ'q. Co.. Inc.. 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir. 
1980); Time. Inc, v. Johnston. 448 F.2d 378, 380-382 (4th Cir. 1971).
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to be persecuted for a crime committed so long before. Briscoe, 4 
Cal. 3d at 542. Second, the article made no mention of when the 
crime occurred. at 533. The case at bar is distinguished
because it was clear in Globe' s article that the events were not 
current. Third, the public figure status in Briscoe would wane 
only because public attention to the controversy had waned. Id. 
at 540. Senator Kennedy's murder, however, has received constant 
attention; in fact, another book referring to Mr. Khawar's name 
was published in 1991. (R.T. 1409:7-15.)
F. Media Access Is Wot Part Of The Standard For Limited
Puroosp Public Figures. And Even If It Were.,_Respondent
Had Sufficient Media Access.
One factor that can separate public from private figures is 
"effective opportunities for rebutting [defamatory] statements." 
Mosesian v. McClatchv. 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1694 (1991). The 
Mosesian court did not hold that media access was a prerequisite 
to public figure status. Neither did this Court in Vegod Coyp-—v_^ 
ABC. Inc.. 25 Cal. 3d 763, 768 (1979). Veaod involved the closing 
down of a San Francisco department store. Id. at 765. The 
plaintiff in that case had not discussed the close-out with the 
media. Id. at 768. That fact, however, was only one among many 
that lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not taken any 
voluntary acts. Id.
Respondent, in the instant case, did engage in independent 
substantial voluntary acts and also enjoyed media access. He met 
with the president of Pakistan in 1984 because of his suposed 
"very prominent" status in America. (R.T. 1411:18-28; 1412:1-12.)
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He then gave an interview to a television station to discuss the 
book. (R.T. 1398:3-7.)
Moreover, there is no evidence that he tried to defend 
himself and was unable to do so because of his private figure 
status. Given the justification for the media access argument 
(that private figures are disadvantaged by a lack of media 
access), any indication that Mr. Khawar desperately tried, and 
failed, to counter the accusations against him is glaringly 
lacking. Within two months of reading Mr. Morrow's book, Mr. 
Khawar was able to refute the charges on television. (R.T. 
1397:28, 1398:1-2.)
G. Even Absent A Voluntary Act. Respondent Is An 
Involuntary Limited Purpose Public Figure.
The designation of involuntary limited purpose public figure 
has been neither adopted nor rejected in California. An 
involuntary limited purpose public figure is one who, through no 
purposeful action, becomes a public figure because he becomes 
embroiled in a public controversy or affair. See Gertz v. Robert 
Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Although the Court said 
that instances will be rare in which an individual becomes a 
public figure, some courts have adopted the status.
An air-traffic controller who witnessed a well-known air 
disaster became an involuntary limited purpose public figure in 
Dameron v. Washington Magazine. Inc.. 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). Dameron could not "fairly be said to have 'injected' 
himself into the controversy. . . [he] had the misfortune to have 
a tragedy occur on his watch." Id. The Dameron court reasoned
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that, despite the lack of a voluntary act, "[i]njection is not the 
only means by which public-figure status is achieved. Persons can 
be involved in public controversies and affairs without their
consent or will." Dameron. 779 F.2d at 741. The air disaster 
involving Dameron was "a major public occurrence." at 737.
Dameron then became public "through sheer bad luck." Xd- 742.
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin also affirmed an 
involuntary limited purpose public figure finding in pay View 
Packing Co. v. Wolfe. 543 N.W.2d 522, 533-34 (Wis. 1995). Bay 
View Packing involved a company who pickled food items and was 
then accused by the defendants of having used tainted local water 
in their products. Id. at 524-27. Although the £.ay Vi^w Packing 
court recognized that it was through "sheer bad luck" and not 
actions, the plaintiffs were nevertheless involuntary limited 
purpose public figures. Id. at 533-34.
An important component of involuntary limited purpose public 
figure status is whether or not the public controversy existed at
the time of the alleged defamation. Grossman v_._Smart, 807
F.Supp. 1404, 1410 (Ill. 1992). In Grossman, the defamation 
involved statements made imputing unfitness and want of integrity 
with respect to the employment duties of the plaintiff.
1406. The only undisputed voluntary act in Grossman was the
plaintiff’s application for employment with a University. Id_s_ at 
1409. The reason that they did not find involuntary limited 
purpose public figure status was because there was no evidence of 
a public controversy in existence at the time that the dispute 
arose. Id. at 1410. That evinces an important factor that can
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separate voluntary from involuntary limited purpose public 
figures.
Mr. Khawar is one of the rare individuals who would be an 
involuntary limited purpose public figure even if he had not 
engaged in any voluntary acts. He had the "sheer bad luck" to be 
present and in the limelight on the night when Senator Kennedy was 
killed. The public controversy in question occurred twenty years 
before the article and continues today and was thus in place 
during the alleged defamation, thereby distinguishing this case 
from Grossman. Additionally, the public controversy of the murder 
is of such enormous proportions that it in fact transcends the 
"major public occurrence" air disaster at issue in Dameron.
This Court should, in the absence of declaring Mr. Khawar a 
voluntary limited purpose public figure, find that he was an 
involuntary limited purpose public figure. He was involved in the 
public controversy from its inception through the Time article. 
(R.T. 1392:3-18.) Regardless of his own will, he became embroiled 
in the issue. Other courts have found involuntary limited purpose 
public figure status in similar situations, and the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts also considers public concern as invoking a 
priviledge. An event of such meaning as the RFK murder needs to 
be reported. Media access to proper reporting would be 
unacceptably curtailed if they could not report on the stories
' "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other ... if the matter publicized is 
of a kind that . . . (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Restat. 
2d Torts § 652D (emphasis added).
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involving the relevant players in conspiracy theories questioning 
government involvement.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES WERE WRONGLY AWARDED BECAUSE NO ACTUAL
MALICE WAS SHOWN DURING THE TRIAL.
A. The Trial Sbnwed No High Dearee of Awareness of prob^blg
falsity of the Article's Allegations.
In order to award punitive damages in a defamation suit, 
there must be facts supporting a finding of "actual malice. St^ 
Amant y. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). "Actual malice" can 
be shown by sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of 
his publication. Examples of evidence of these serious
doubts are "where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the 
product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified 
anonymous phone call." Id. at 732. This Court distinguished 
"actual malice" from "constitutional malice" by its "greater 
burden in obtaining redress." Brown v. Kelly Broad- Co.. 48 Cal. 
3d 711, 745 (1989) (in bank) . This Court has also held that the 
evidentiary standard must be met by clear and convincing evidence. 
See Reader's Digest Ass'n- Inc. V_^—Superigy 37 Cal. 3d 244,
252 (1984) (quoting Brewer v■ Memphis Publ*q CP• ,—^26 F.2d 
1238, 1258 (5th Cir. 1980)).
There was no clear and convincing evidence presented at trial 
that Mr. Blackburn in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his article in the Glo.b£. The publication was not 
fabricated by him nor based wholly on an unverified anonymous 
phone call. Mr. Blackburn read Mr. Morrow’s book, which itself is
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replete with footnotes and exhibits. (R.T. 1093:15-17; R.T. 
1101:24-25.) He interviewed Mr. Morrow before writing the story. 
(R.T. 1092:15.) Another book had been published in 1991 that told 
the same scenario as Mr. Morrow's book. (R.T. 1409:7-15.) The 
fact that he could not find Mr. Khawar to be interviewed (R.T. 
1121:3-4) does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
in fact had serious doubts about the truth of the article. There 
is no evidence to indicate that he did harbor such doubts, and the 
clear and convincing evidence standard precludes the Court from 
merely inferring that doubts were present.^
B. The Traditional Recklessness Standard Is Insufficient
For The Award Of Punitive Damages.
There exists no lesser standard for the awarding of punitive 
damages than the actual malice discussed above. See St. Amant v. 
Thompson. 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968). The recklessness component 
to actual malice is only a rephrasing of malice and not a separate 
standard that can be met by anything less than the malice 
standard. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 
244, 256-57 (1984). It is "publishing with such doubts [those of 
actual malice] shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice." Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal.
3d 711, 722 (1989) fquoting St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968)). In order for Globe to have been reckless to a
*' The jury received instructions under BAJI No. 2.22. Because 
Blackburn could not recall if he had contacted Respondent and others while 
they testified that he had not, they were permitted to reject Blackburn's 
entire testimony. Rejection of Blackburn’s testimony, however, does not lead 
to clear and convincing evidence of Blackburn's alleged doubts about 
truthfulness. Khalid Khawar v. Globe Int’l Inc.. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 106 
(1996) .
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unitive degree, therefore, there would still need to exist clear 
and convincing evidence that Blackburn harbored serious doubts 
about the truth of his article. The record does not reflect any
evidence of such doubts.
Tf RpQnondent Ts A Private Figure, The Dgf^mation
■ inrludes Private figures.
The constitutional privilege defined in Ngw Yprk Times 
includes defamation relating to private figures where the 
statements concerned matters of "general or public interest. "
V. Inc.^- 403 U.S. 29, 32 (1971) (plurality
opinion). Although the Gertz Court somewhat limited this 
protection for completely private figures, the Court has continued 
to recognize a more stringent standard than recklessness for 
defamation of private figures. The Court affirmed a lower than 
"actual malice" standard in Dun & Bradstreet;, Ing. v. Greenmoss.
Inc.. 472 U.S. 749, 751-52 (1985)(plurality opinion). 
That case, however, is readily distinguishable as there was 
absolutely no public concern in the defamation involved. For 
private figures, the Court has held that the states have relative 
freedom to establish the appropriate standard of liability for 
defamatory publication as long as they do no implement strict 
liability. .See Gertz v. Robert Welch.—Inc. , 418 U.S. 323, 347
(1974) .
In accordance with Gertz, the Supreme Court has also held 
that when the speech involves a public issue, a private figure
22
must surmount a much higher barrier when recovering damages. 
Philadelphia^Newspapers. Inc v. Hepps. 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) . 
The status of the plaintiff is not the focus; rather the court 
must determine if the speech involved a public issue. Id.
The assassination of Senator Kennedy is a matter of public 
issue. It has attracted, and continues to attract, an inordinate 
amount of attention. Conspiracy theories have been rampant about 
the murder of both Kennedy brothers, and various media sources 
have publicized these. Even if Mr. Khawar himself could be 
classified as a private figure, the assassination has reached such 
a status that the malice standard must go beyond that for the 
normal private figure.
III. GLOBE SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE NEUTRAL 
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE IT SHIELDS ACCURATE,
DISINTERESTED AND NEWSWORTHY REPORTING FROM DEFAMATION 
ACTIONS.
As a neutral, disinterested and accurate republication of 
defamation, the Globe article at issue should be protected from 
liability. The common law defamation cause of action provides 
that a republisher of defamation is as liable as the original 
publisher, absent a nearly insurmountable defense of truth. See 
Gill v. Hughes. 227 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1309 (1991); also Rest.
2d Torts § 578. The combination of the republication doctrine and 
the truth defense deters free publication because publishers are 
subjected to the possibility of costly defamation actions. See 
New York Times. 376 U.S. at 279. This inherent deterrence of free
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speech in defamation laws led the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
to adopt the "neutral reportage" privilege to provide a cushion 
from liability for neutral and accurate republications. SS®
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'v. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1977)
The Edwards court found that a publication is granted 
immunity from liability where a reporter accurately, 
disinterestedly, and in good faith republishes defamation, even 
when there are "serious doubts" regarding the truth of the 
statements involved. at 120. The Edward^ case involved a Ngw
York Times article that reported defamatory statements made 
originally against DDT research scientists by members of the 
National Audubon Society. Id^ at 113. The court recognized the 
important public interest in the controversy and reasoned that the 
accusations were newsworthy simply because they had been uttered. 
Id. at 120.
’ Respondent contends that the neutral reportage privilege lies in a 
vacuum and is not supported by precedent or Supreme Court authority. In fact, 
the Edwards court relied on previous decisions that recognized an analogous 
privilege although the term "neutral reportage privilege" was not coined until 
Edwards. See Oliver v. Village Voice. Inc.. 417 F.Supp 235, 238 {S.D.N.Y.
1976)(holding that republished allegations of CIA involvement made by a person 
with prominent involvement in Watergate constituted a legitimate news story);
.r Time. Inc. ■ 439 F.2d 1129 (1st Cir. 1971) (upholding summary :udgment 
since Time did not assert the statements published were true and the 
republication was accurate); and ge? fjgvgl y. 338 F.Supp 977, 982-83
(N.D.Ill. 1971)(granting summary judgment appropriate where publication 
consisted of an accurate report of defamatory statements made by a principal 
figure in sensational investigation of the JFK assassination).
Several Supreme Court cases pre-dating Edwards also imply the existence 
of a limited reporting privilege. £££ Coy; Prp^d- Co.. V- Cpbn, 420 U.S. 1469, 
1491 (1975)(recognizing a limited privilege for publications involving public 
records); Time. Inc, v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448. 457 (1976) (extending the 
record privilege to defamation actions); v- 401 U.S. 279
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The central issue in Edwards is that defamation actions
threaten the freedom of the press guaranteed in the First 
Amendment. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 113. The First Amendment 
protects the free flow of information and the public debate of 
issues that is central to American democracy. See Edwards. 556 
F.2d at 122; see also New York Times. Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 
254, 270-71 (1964)(recognizing a "background of profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"). Making publishers liable 
for the publication of defamation presents a serious deterrent to 
free speech because costly defamation suits lead publications to 
stop publishing information that may be important to public 
debate. See New York Times. 376 U.S. at 279. Neutral and 
accurate republications of defamation are therefore, shielded from 
liability under the neutral reportage privilege. See Edwards. 556 
F.2d at 120.
Although this Court has never had the occasion to adopt the 
privilege, the neutral reportage privilege has been adopted by a 
number of state and federal courts.® Some courts and scholars have
(1971)(protecting a republication of allegations from a Civil Right Commission 
Report from defamation despite alterations and ommissions in the report).
® In addition to the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adopted the 
privilege, Price v. Vi)cinQ Penguin. Inc.. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Third Circuit has equivocated by refusing to adopt the privilege in dicta. 
£££ Dickey v. CBS. Inc.. 583 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1980); iail see 
Medico v. Time. Inc.. 643 F.2d 134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981)(noting a federal 
trend towards adoption of the privilege and that therefore the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court might also be persuaded to also adopt the privilege). The Ninth 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have not yet addressed the adoption of the 
privilege since numerous defamation cases were disposed of without reaching 
the constitutional issue. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police. 707
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criticized the inexact standards established in Edwards, but as 
subsequent decisions have illustrated, the touchstone of the 
neutral reportage privilege is the accuracy of the reporting. See 
Inc.. 584 F.Supp 1110, 1125 (N.D.Cal. 1984); aM 
Tnf 1. Ltd,., 733 F.Supp 83, 84 (C.D.Cal.
1990) . The neutral, disinterested, and accurate nature of a 
report should protect the republication of defamatory statements
from liability. £ge Edw4rd.s, 556 F.2d at 120.
Respondent contends that the Supreme Court's public/private 
figure standard for defamation actions established in Qertz v.
ch Tnc. . 418 U.S. 323 (1974) conflicts with the Edwards
standard based on the "newsworthy" status of the defamatory 
statements involved. This contention lac)ts merit. As established 
in section II.C. above, the Supreme Court has recognized in post- 
nertz decisions that the public/private figure distinction for 
defamation actions is not dispositive. See Philadelphia 
N^w^neners. Inc. V. Henns, 475 U.S. 767, 774-75 (1986). Thus, the 
neutral reportage doctrine is not inconsistent with Supreme Court 
authority. See Barry v. TjTtie. Inc. , 584 F.Supp 1110, 1124 
(N.D.Cal. 1984) (holding the court was not persuaded that any 
“Supreme Court authority preclude[d] adoption of the 
privilege")(emphasis added).
F.Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989){declining to address the neutral reportage privilege
because case resolved via the common law privilege) . ^ .c, ^ „ t j
For state courts adopting the privilege April V-i—ggtor Hera 
Inc. . 546 N.E.2d. 466 {Ohio 1988); V. *368 So. 2d 512
{FI. Ct. App. 1985).
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A. California Should Adopt The Neutral Reportage Privilege.
California is a state that has long-honored protections of 
the freedom of the press. See Wilson v. Superior Court. 13 Cal.
3d 652, 658 (1975). In a corollary provision to the First 
Amendment, the California Constitution provides: ''[e]very person 
may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right." Cal. 
Const, art. I, § 2. The California Constitution thus grants 
broader freedom to the press than does the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. See Wilson. 13 Cal. 3d at 680.
California has a long-recognized publication privilege for 
fair report involving public officials as well. See Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 47(3)-(4). Following the Supreme Court's lead in New York 
Times, California Courts of Appeal have also recognized the 
superiority of free speech principles over both private and public 
figure plaintiffs where there is no malice and the speech is of 
public concern. See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland. 47 Cal. App. 
4th 364, 377 (1996); see also Rollenhaaen v. City of Orange. 116 
Cal. App. 3d 414, 420 (1981).
Moreover, California courts have recognized the neutral 
reportage doctrine by analogy in three cases. Although these 
cases have not specifically presented the opportunity to address 
the adoption of the privilege, the privilege has been cited with 
authority. Stockton Newspapers. Inc, v. .Sunerior Court. 206
Cal. App. 3d 966, 976 (1988)(resolving the issue under Civil Code
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§ 47(4)-- which protects reports involving officials in public 
office--and, therefore, not deciding the constitutional 
privilege); accord Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872 
(1980) ; and see Weinaarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148 
(1980) (citing Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120 with approval) . These 
developments support the contention that California has recognized 
and honored the concepts underlying the neutral reportage 
privilege.
Federal District courts in California have also adopted the 
neutral reportage privilege. See Barry v. Tim^—Inc_^, 584 F.Supp 
1110 (N.D.Cal. 1984) (involving a defamation suit by a former USF 
basketball coach against Sports Illustrated for publishing two 
articles detailing an athlete's allegations of NCAA recruiting 
violations). The court adopted, but limited the privilege so that 
it applies to neutral and accurate republications when the 
plaintiff is a general or limited purpose public figure, and the 
defamatory statements are made by a party to an existing 
controversy.® at 127. The court in Ward v. News Grpup Int'l,
Inc. ■ 733 F.Supp 83 (C-D.Cal. 1990) also adopted the privilege as 
determined by Barrv and found that the plaintiff was a public 
figure, the parties making defamatory statements were parties to 
the action, and "most importantly for First Amendment purposes,
" Not all courts have held that the privilege is limited tc public 
figures. See T.^v-in ... MrPhee. 917 F.Supp 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), 119 F-3d
189 (1997) (applying the privilege where a publication is (1) accurate and 
disinterested; (2) regarding a newsworthy controversy; (3) the statements are
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the publication was done in a neutral and accurate manner." Id. 
at 84.
Respondent points to Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal. 3d 
711 (1989) (in bank), as a retreat from a position favoring the 
adoption of the neutral reportage privilege. In Brown, this Court 
refused to adopt the proposed broad extension of the statutory 
reporting privilege under Civil Code § 47(3). Brown. 48 Cal. 3d 
at 738. However, the Brown decision is misleading for two 
reasons. First, it relied on statutory construction, whereas this 
case is not similarly confined because the neutral reportage 
doctrine is a common law privilege. Since the issue of the 
neutral reportage privilege was not before the court, it only 
addressed a general reportage privilege in dicta. at 423
(acknowledging that the court's decision rested on statutory 
construction not public policy).
Second, the Brown decision was based largely on an analysis 
of the ancient tradition of libel law. See Id. at 716. Libel 
suits certainly pre-dated the First Amendment and California has a 
long history of strict liability for defamation. See Id. at 729- 
33. However, the majority of cases cited in the Brown opinion 
date back to the early part of the twentieth century and pre-date 
New York Times.Thus, Brown cannot fairly be cited as authority
made by a responsible and prominent source; and (4) the report does not 
endorse the statements).
The Brown Court examined the legislative intent of Civil Code 
section 47(3), originally enacted in 1872 and found that at that time strict 
liability was the norm for defamation actions. Id. at 716. The Court
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for the proposition that California has refused to adopt the
neutral reportage privilege.
1. Public Policy Favors Creating A Cushion For The 
RepubHcation Of Defamation In Order To Protect 
The Freedom Of The Press.
Although this Court has not expressly recognized the neutral 
reportage doctrine, public policy favors the adoption of the 
privilege. See Comment. Constitutional Privilege to Republl.sh 
Defamation. 77 Colum. L.Rev. 1266 (1977). Contrary to 
Respondent's fears, the neutral reportage privilege is not in 
danger of spiraling out of control and encroaching on the privacy 
interests of California citizens. The privilege provides a 
workable balance for protecting neutral and accurate 
republications of defamation yet still requiring that publishers 
be held liable when they "concur in" or "deliberately distort" 
published statements. See Edwards., 556 F.2d at 120. Libel laws 
have grown increasingly less stringent over time and the trend has 
been to move away from strict liability towards the "actual 
malice" standard.“ A person's reputation is still deserving of 
protection but the public interest in encouraging free debate and 
effective dissemination of ideas demands protection for neutral 
and accurate republications of defamation. Thus, California
subsequently cited numerous cases dating back to the original enactment of the 
statute and found that strenuous standards for liability were consistently 
upheld in California. Id. at 717, 729-33.
In the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court stated that an 
overwhelming majority of courts had adopted a similar "actual malice" standard 
for defamation actions, York Times. 376 U.S. at 280.
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should follow the lead of other courts and adopt the neutral 
reportage privilege.
2. Protecting A Reoublisher Of Defamation From
Liability Provides A Defamation Plaintiff With
Adequate Recourse.
An original publisher of defamation remains liable for all 
subsequent publications that the original publisher might 
reasonably foresee. See Simeon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 615 
(1923). A defamation plaintiff, therefore, will still have 
adequate legal recourse. Indeed, libel suits are more 
appropriately directed toward the original defamer rather than the 
republisher since the republisher often times will not have 
knowledge of the falsity of statements involved. Allowing a 
defamation plaintiff to recover against a republisher and original 
publisher allows a windfall. This Court has recognized that First 
Amendment freedoms can be threatened by litigation itself, even in 
the absence of recovery. See Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach.
Inc. V. Superior Court. 22 Cal. 3d 672, 685 (1978). The multiple 
levels of recovery available to defamation plaintiffs deter the 
media from publishing information that may be of public interest 
and therefore unnecessarily threaten the free flow of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.
B. The Globe Article Is Appropriately Protprted From
Liability For Defamation As A Neutral And Accurate
Report.
The article published by Globe was a fair an accurate report 
of Robert Morrow's book. The Senator Must Die. The article
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contained fifteen attributions to Morrow, establishing the 
neutrality and accuracy of the report. {R.T. 1596:1-13.) Mr. 
Blackburn's deposition testimony and lead sheet reflected that the 
Globe article was a "news story" based on "a new theory of the 
killing of Senator Kennedy" by Robert Morrow. (R.T. 1095:6-8; 
1093:9-10; 1126:14-15.) The article was published in order to 
notify the public about the publication of Morrow's book as a 
newsworthy event in and of itself. This court has recognized that 
the essence of the First Amendment is the free flow of information 
of public interest. See Wilson V- Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 
652, 658 (1975) (holding that "in this state we have consistently 
viewed with great solicitude the right to uninhibited comment on 
public issues"). The speech at issue here is relevant to that 
goal. As established above in section I.B., the Kennedy 
assassinations, conspiracy theories and questioning possible 
government involvement in these events has been an issue of 
continued public interest. As a result, the Qlobe article is 
exactly the type of publication appropriately protected by the 
neutral reportage privilege and should be shielded from liability
as a neutral and accurate republication.
1. ThP- Globe article did not concur in oy deliberately
alter statements from Morrow's book.
The neutral reportage privilege protects accurate and 
disinterested reporting, even when the reporter has "serious 
doubts" as to the truth of the statements involved. ^ Edwards,
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556 F.2d at 120. Therefore, protection from defamation is granted 
to a republisher of defamation, as long as a republisher refrains 
from "espousing," "concurring," or "deliberately distorting" the 
charges. See Edwards. 556 F.2d at 120.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has continuously held that where 
speech of public concern is involved, even demonstrably false 
speech is protected from liability. See Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine. Inc.. 501 U.S. 496 (1991)(holding that even deliberate 
alterations are protected, unless the changes resulted in 
"material alteration in the meaning"); Time. Inc, v. Pape>. 401 
U.S. 279 (1971)(holding a significant alteration in wording did 
not change the meaning of the article).
The Globe article published here contained the inaccurate 
statement that Ali Ahmand assassinated Robert Kennedy. (C.T.
3154.) However, like Time. the Globe article was not an 
"independant report" but rather an accurate report of Morrow's 
assassination theory. See Time. 401 U.S. at 285; (R.T. 1095:6-8.) 
The statements in the article were attributed to Morrow and were 
not advocated by Globe as being true. (R.T. 1596:1-13.) 
Plaintiff's expert Mr. McSweeny testified that the numerous 
attributions in the article made it clear that the statements 
published in the Globe article came from Morrow's book. (R.T. 
860:26-863:18.) Therefore, no "espousing" or "material alteration 
in the meaning" occurred to remove the constitutional protection 
granted to accurate and disinterested publications.
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2. iTndfir thp neutral reportage privilege, different
nf writing are accorded varying amounts gf
"literary license^.
This Court has adopted the standard that all publications 
must necessarily be permitted some degree of flexibility in their 
choice of the proper words and phrases in reporting. Reader s
Digest As.q'n. Inc, v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 261, 262 
(1984)(holding that the magazine had "literary license" to choose 
its own language because "the choice of such language, though 
reflecting a misconception, does not place the speech beyond the 
outer limits of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella." 
(citing Time. Inc, v. Pape. 401 U.S. 279, 290-292 (1970) ) .
Accordingly, Globe's choice of language to express the ideas 
of Mr. Blackburn does not affect its neutral status. For example, 
the cover of the Globe issue at hand contained the headlines "Cure 
Baldness With Vodka & Alka Seltzer" and "Johnny Carson's Mad 
Inventor Weds Girl of 8" in addition to the headline for Mr. 
Blackburn's article. (C.T. 3144.) At trial, Mr McSweeny 
testified that the stylistic differences allotted to varying 
publications include the ability to use hyperbolic phrases and 
that Globe had a constitutional right to publish Mr. Blackburn's 
article. (R.T. 845:23-846:6; 867:2-868:8.) Furthermore, this 
Court recognized that "'there is no such thing as a false idea'" 
and that sometimes factual language becomes opinion. Bee (Gregory 
V. McDonnell Douglas Coro.. 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601 (1976) (c^ritinq
v_ Robert Walsh. Inc., 418 U.S. 333, 339 (1974)). As an
34
article conveying a theory to the public, the statements here, as 
in Gregory, were "neither factual in nature nor intended to induce 
the audience . to believe they were factual." Gregory. 17 
Cal. 3d at 601. In this vein, the Globe article constituted an 
accurate communication of Morrow's theory to the public.
3. The neutral reportage privilege contains no duty to
investigate.
The neutral reportage doctrine does not reguire a reporter or 
a publisher to investigate defamatory statements prior to 
publication so long as those statements are neutrally and 
accurately reported. See Edwards. 566 F.2d at 120. Likewise, 
there is no duty to publish the other side of a given controversy. 
See Time, Inc, v. Pape. 401 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1971); ^nd see Evans 
V. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1498-99 (1995) (publishing the 
other side of a story is not necessary); see also Gomes v. Fried. 
136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 934 (1982){holding an objective picture of 
events is not required); and see Bindrim v. Mifrhell. 92 Cal. App. 
3d 61, 73 (1979)(holding there is no duty to investigate when the 
source is reliable).
Here, Mr. Blackburn testified that he made calls to 
investigate the article and attempted to get "Ali Ahmand's" side, 
but he had no notes of such calls. (R.T. 1141:3-6; 1141:6-9.)
Mr. Blaclcburn's difficulty in contacting Mr. Khawar was largely 
due to the fact that Mr. Khawar identified himself as "Khalid 
Iqbal" to police on the night of the Kennedy assassination and was
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misidentified as "Ali Ahmand" in Morrow's book. (R.T. 1393:23-24; 
C.T. 3145.) Therefore, despite the failure to investigate or 
publish the other side, Mr. Kirsch testified in his expert opinion 
that Mr. Blackburn satisfied any investigation duty in attempting 
to contact "Ali Ahmand." (R.T. 1602:25-1603:3.) Thus, any 
failure to investigate or publish Mr. Khawar's side do not render 
the Globe article ineligible for protection under the neutral 
reportage privilege.
4. Robert Morrow qualifies as a responsible and
nrominent source for the purpose of the neutral
reportage privilege.
” The requirement that the neutral reportage privilege is 
limited to "responsible or prominent organizations or individuals" 
has largely been abandoned by subsequent courts that have adopted 
the privilege. See Rarrv v. Time. Inc., 584 F.Supp 1110, 1126 
(N.D.Cal. 1984)(extending the privilege to all republications 
regardless of the "trustworthiness of the original defamer"); see 
.icn Tn rp united Press Int'l. 106 B.R. 323 (D.D.C. 1989)(holding 
that limiting the privilege to prominent sources was inconsistent 
with purpose of privilege).
Robert Morrow qualifies as a reputable source according to 
the neutral reportage privilege. Morrow had published several 
books prior to The Senator Must Die and was known for establishing 
governmental conspiracy theories. The publication of Morrow's 
book Betrayal aided in the creation of the House Select Committee 
on Assassinations. (R.T. 841:17-19.) Colonel Prouty, a reputable
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member of the U.S. government, wrote the forward to The Senator
Must Die, lending further credence to the validity of Morrow and 
his book as a reputable source. (R.T. 1124:21-28.)
A careful examination of the facts in this case and the 
totality of the article establishes that the Globe article meets 
the neutral reportage requirements established by Edwards. The 
article constituted a neutral, accurate, and disinterested 
republication of a newsworthy accusation made by a reliable 
source. Accordingly, the Globe article is properly covered by the 
neutral reportage privilege and thus should receive protection 
from liability for defamation.
5. The jury correctly found that the Globe article was
a neutral and accurate report.
Not only does the Globe article satisfy the criteria for the 
neutral reportage privilege, but the jury found in their special 
verdict that the article was a fair and accurate report of 
Morrow's book. (C.T. 2780-83.) The trial judge intervened and 
overruled portions of the verdict, a decision that constituted 
error in three different ways. (C.T. 2742-44.) The correct 
standard of review of the issue of neutral reportage is whether 
after an independent de novo review of the entire record, 
substantial evidence supports the finding. See Weinaarten v.
Block. 102 Cal. App. 3d 129 (1980).
First, the judge incorrectly overruled the jury's finding 
that the article was a neutral and accurate report. See Cal. Code
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of civ. Proc. § 624 (defining a special verdict as that by which 
the jury finds the "conclusions of fact as established by the 
evidence . - . and nothing shall remain to the Court but to draw 
from them conclusions of law.") (emphasis added) . The jury 
received an instruction based on Edwards, and after being 
presented with all of the evidence, determined that the Qlohe 
article was a neutral and accurate report.(C.T. 280-83.) Like 
the jury's finding in Edwards. it is "implicit" in the jury's 
finding that the Globe neutrally and accurately reported elements 
from Morrow's book and therefore, as the Fdwards court determined, 
"a judgment against the (Globe] , in the face of this finding of 
fact, is constitutionally impermissible." Edwards, 556 F.2d Id^ 
at 120.
Second, the trial judge inappropriately undertook a fact 
finding duty that was delegated to the jury in determining that 
the photograph in the Globe article was altered and, therefore, 
that Globe was originally liable for defamation. (R.T. 2743:12- 
15.) The judge exceeded his function by acting as a photographic 
expert regarding an issue of fact. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §
624. Moreover, the issue was never raised in the pleadings, the 
complaint, or by Mr. Khawar's counsel during the trial and thus
Jury instruction number twenty-six required the jury to determine 
that: (1) Robert Morrow was a responsible source; (2) the plaintiff was a
public figure; (3) there was a newsworthy, public controversy regarding the 
allegations of Morrow; (4) the Globe publication accurately conveyed the 
charges; (5) Globe did not espouse or concur in or deliberately alter the 
allegations; (6) Globe reasonably attempted to obtain plaintiff's side; and 
(7) Globe reasonably made efforts to verify the charges. (C.T. 2883.)
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the trial judge independently undertook a determination that was 
both in error and prejudicial to Globe. (R.T. 2741:2-3.) The
judge himself admitted the uncertainty of his actions by declaring 
that his determination would constitute a "nice little point on 
appeal". (R.T. 2753:4.)
In addition, a careful examination of the photograph does not 
support the judge's conclusion. Mr. Khawar testified that he 
removed the picture of himself and Senator Kennedy from his office 
because "the almost exactly [sic] same picture ha[d] been 
published in Globe magazine." (R.T. 1423:6-8.) The judge 
determined that the first time a recognizable photograph of Mr. 
Khawar had been used was in the Globe. (R.T. 2744:6-8.) However,
Mr. Khawar testified that after viewing the Globe article, he 
believed that not many people would recognize him. (R.T. 1362:13- 
15.) Thus, the photograph was not sufficiently different to 
constitute original defamation and the judge's fact-finding 
constituted prejudicial error.
Finally, the judge erred in examining the photograph alone 
and divorced from the entire context of the whole article. See 
Gorman v. Blanchard. 211 Cal. App. 2d 126 (1962)(holding that when 
determining the defamatory nature of a publication, the entire 
publication, not simply parts, must be examined). Even if 
determining the applicability of the neutral reportage privilege 
was a question of law, the judge was required to consider the 
article in its entirety in order to determine if the privilege
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applied. The Globe article, when considered in its entirety--as 
was done by the jury--constitutes a neutral, accurate, and 
disinterested report properly subject to protection under the 
neutral reportage privilege.
CONCLUSION
Public figures must prove actual malice to receive punitive 
damages in a defamation action. Respondent voluntarily injected 
himself into a vortex of public controversy through his 
perseverance in photographing and being seen with public figures, 
including the late Senator Kennedy. He is therefore a voluntary 
limited purpose public figure and must show actual malice. 
Alternatively, he became involved in a "major public occurrence" 
and thus, through "sheer bad luck," became an involuntary limited 
purpose public figure. Because there was no evidence submitted at 
the trial that Mr. Blackburn had actual knowledge that the 
accusations contained in the Globe article were false, this Court 
should reverse the award for punitive damages. In addition, the 
Globe article constituted a neutral and accurate report of 
statements made in Morrow's book and, therefore, the article 
should be protected from defamation liability under the neutral 
reportage privilege. Accordingly, California should adopt the 
neutral reportage privilege. For the foregoing reasons,
Petitioner prays this Court reverse the lower court decision.
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